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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

Case No. 950452-CA

v.
Priority No. 2

BRYAN JAY STEPHENS,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals the denial of his motion to suppress and his convictions for
felony and misdemeanor drug offenses. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion to suppress evidence
since defendant's consent to search under the seat of his car objectively included
consent to search a closed container where the drugs were located? This Court
reviews factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to suppress evidence for
clear error, and will find clear error only if the trial court's factual findings are not
adequately supported in the record. State v. Anderson. 910 P.2d 1229, 1232 (Utah
1996) (citing State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851, 854 (Utah 1992); State v. Pena. 869 P.2d

932, 935-936 (Utah 1994)). However, this Court reviews the trial court's conclusions
of law based on such facts under a correctness standard, according no deference to the
trial court's legal conclusions. IsL
2. Did the trial court's instruction to the jury cure any error in the
prosecutor's closing argument comment that "you all know the impact that this
type of offense has"? Has defendant established a reasonable likelihood that, but
for this comment, he would have been acquitted? This Court will reverse on the
basis of prosecutorial misconduct only if defendant has shown that
the actions or remarks of [prosecuting] counsel call to the attention of the
jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in determining its
verdict and, if so, under the circumstances of the particular case, . . . the
error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable
likelihood that, in its absence, there would have been a more favorable
result. . . .
State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750, 754 (Utah App. 1996); accord State v. Troy, 688 P.2d
483, 486 (Utah 1984); State v. Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287, 1290 (Utah App. 1994),
cert, denied, 892 P.2d 13 (Utah 1995). In determining whether a given statement
constitutes prosecutorial misconduct, the statement must be viewed in light of "the
totality of the evidence presented at trial." Stevenson, 884 P.2d at 1290 (citing State v.
Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah App. 1992).
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
United States Constitution, Amendment IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 14:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the person or thing to be seized.1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged in an Information with one count of unlawful possession
of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2)(a)(I) (1991); one count of unlawful possession of a
controlled substance (marijuana), a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §58-37-8(2)(a)(I) (1991); and one count of unlawful possession of drug
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37a-5
(1981) (R. 5-7).
Defendant moved to suppress the methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug
paraphernalia seized from his car after he consented to a search following a traffic stop
1

Defendant has not asserted or briefed a separate state constitutional claim
(Def. Br. at 1 n.l). Any state constitutional argument should be deemed waived. State
v. Carter. 707 P.2d 656, 660-661 (Utah 1985).
3

(R. 25-31). The State provided a written response (R. 33-40). After a hearing (R.
163-195), the trial court denied defendant's motion (R. 41-46).
After the State rested its case-in-chief at trial, defendant renewed his motion to
suppress (R. 293-295), which the trial court again denied (R. 296-297). After a jury
trial, defendant was convicted on all three counts (R. 93-95; 366-369), and was
sentenced to zero-to-five years at the Utah State Prison on count one, and concurrent
terms of 180 days each in Salt Lake County Jail on counts two and three (R. 136-139).
The execution of defendant's sentence was stayed pending three years probation. Id.
Defendant timely appealed (R. 136-139, 144-145).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Point I. For purposes of the motion to suppress, the parties stipulated to the
facts in the police report which was attached to the State's response to defendant's
motion (R. 164-167; g££ R. 39-40). After the hearing on the motion, the trial court
made the following findings of fact:
1. On February 20, 1995, Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff Dave
Broadhead witnessed the defendant Bryan Jay Stephens violate the traffic
code by failing to properly signal while turning left (eastbound) at 300
West and 4500 South.
2. Deputy Broadhead activated his overhead lights to effect a traffic stop.
The defendant did not immediately stop and made several rapid
movements to the right prior to stopping. As Deputy Broadhead exited
his vehicle and approached, the defendant made another rapid "stuffing"
movement to the right.
3. The defendant denied making any stuffing movements when asked
about his actions prior and after stopping by Deputy Broadhead. In
4

response to Deputy Broadhead's query if he had any concealed weapons
or contraband under the seat, the defendant said; [sic] "No, you're free to
look if you want."
4. Because of the defendant's apparent extreme nervousness, Deputy
Broadhead explained to the defendant his concern for his safety as well as
the possibility that the defendant had placed a weapon or contraband
under the front seat. Deputy Broadhead requested permission to check
under the seat and the defendant responded "Go right ahead."
5. The defendant exited the vehicle and Deputy Broadhead looked under
the right front seat where he observed the suspicious movement. Deputed
[sic] Broadhead limited his search to the right front area and found a
brown leather case under the right front seat. On opening the leather
case, Deputy Broadhead found various controlled substances as well as
drug paraphernalia.
6. The defendant denied knowledge or ownership of the leather case at
which time Deputy Broadhead then Mirandized the defendant and arrested
him for possession of controlled substances and drug paraphernalia.
(R. 41-42; £££ addendum A; sL R. 39-40).2
Point II. The following is the pertinent extract from the prosecutor's closing
argument:
You may say, "Well, yeah we have got Mr. Stephens charged with
a crime. There is no victim here with regard to those offenses. We have
only taken roughly two hours to present the case to you today, why all of

2

Defendant argues that, in its written ruling, "the trial court failed to address"
scope of consent (Def. Br. at 5). However, defendant failed to raise scope of consent
as an issue in his motion to suppress or memorandum in support (R. 25-31), and only
vaguely raised it at the end of his brief rebuttal argument in the pretrial hearing on the
motion (R. 193-194). Defendant explicitly raised it as an issue for the first time when
he renewed his suppression motion at trial after the challenged evidence had already
been admitted and the State had rested its case (R. 293-294). §££ State v. Willard. 801
P.2d 189 n.l (Utah App. 1990). Therefore, the trial court's summary treatment of the
issue and denial of the renewed motion, (R. 294-297), can be explained by the timing
and perfunctory manner in which defendant raised it.
5

the big fuss and bother to occupy your time for a day? Well, you all
know the impact that this type of offense has.
MR. YOUNGBERG: Objection, judge.
THE COURT: Sustained and Mr. Christensen I am going to ask
that you refrain from making that argument and, members of the jury, let
me just simply admonish you that your verdict in this case, of course,
must be based solely and totally upon the evidence that is introduced
during this particular case and, of course, you must not be swayed by
public opinion or public feeling. Your decision must be based solely
upon the evidence introduced during this case. You may proceed, Mr.
Christensen.
(R. 351-352; see addendum B).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. The trial court correctly denied defendant's suppression motion since the
general consent to search a vehicle extends to the contents of unlocked containers
found in the vehicle. Defendant does not contest that he consented to a search of his
car. Instead, he argues that his consent to search under the passenger seat of his car
did not extend to a brown leather case the officer found under that seat. Defendant's
argument has been rejected by the United States Supreme Court and by this Court.
When there is no limitation on the scope of consent, consent to search a vehicle extends
to the contents of unlocked containers found in the vehicle.
After the officer explained his concern that defendant had placed a weapon or
contraband under the passenger seat, defendant volunteered, u You're free to look if
you want." When the officer asked if he would consent to a search, defendant said"Go
right ahead." Defendant did not place any explicit limitation on the scope of the
6

officer's search under the seat. Since a reasonable person would be expected to know
that a weapon or contraband is usually carried in some kind of container, it was
objectively reasonable for the officer to conclude that defendant's consent to search
under the seat included his consent to search a container under the seat that might hold
a weapon or contraband. Defendant's consent to search, therefore, extended to the
leather case containing the incriminating drugs and paraphernalia.
2. The trial court's instruction to the jury cured any error in the
prosecutor's comment during closing argument that "you all know the impact that
this type of offense has"; in any event, defendant has failed to establish a
reasonable likelihood that, even absent this comment, he would have been
acquitted. Defendant argues that the prosecutor's comment was so prejudicial that he
should be granted a new trial. However, after sustaining trial defense counsel's
objection, the trial court gave a curative instruction that was sufficient to make any
error harmless. A jury is generally presumed to follow the trial court's instructions. In
any event, defendant has failed to establish a reasonable likelihood that, absent the
prosecutor's comment, he would have been acquitted.

7

ARGUMENT
Point I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
SUPPRESSION MOTION BECAUSE, WHEN THERE IS NO
LIMITATION ON THE SCOPE OF CONSENT, CONSENT TO
SEARCH A VEHICLE EXTENDS TO THE CONTENTS OF
UNLOCKED CONTAINERS FOUND IN THE VEHICLE.
Defendant does not contest that he consented to a search of his car. Instead, he
argues that his consent to search under the passenger seat of his car did not extend to a
brown leather case the officer found under that seat (Def. Br. at 5-8). Defendant's
argument has been rejected in Florida v. Jimeno. I l l S.Ct. 1801 (1991), and State v.
Castner. 825 P.2d 699 (Utah App. 1992), which hold that, when there is no limitation
on the scope of consent, consent to search a vehicle extends to the contents of unlocked
containers found in the vehicle.
The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect's consent under the Fourth
Amendment is that of "objective" reasonableness — "what would the typical reasonable
person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?" Florida
v. Jimeno. I l l S.Ct. 1801, 1803-1804 (1991); acporfl State vt Casfrer, 825 P.2d 699,
705 (Utah App. 1992). If a suspect's consent "would reasonably be understood to
extend to a particular container, the Fourth Amendment provides no grounds for
requiring a more explicit authorization." I*L

8

In Jimeno. the officer stopped the suspect's car after it failed to stop at a red
light before turning. During the traffic stop, the officer told the suspect that he had
reason to believe the suspect was carrying narcotics in his car, and asked permission to
search the car. The suspect consented. After the occupants stepped out of the car, the
officer went to the passenger's side, opened the door, and saw a folded, brown paper
bag on the floor. The officer picked up the bag, opened it, and found a kilogram of
cocaine. Id^at 1803.
The United States Supreme Court upheld this search, concluding that it was
reasonable for the officer to consider Jimeno's general consent to a search of his car for
narcotics to include consent to open a particular container lying on the floor of the car
that might contain narcotics. I$L at 1804. The Court wrote:
In this case, the terms of the search's authorization were simple.
Respondent granted Officer Trujillo permission to search his car, and did
not place any explicit limitation on the scope of the search. Trujillo had
informed respondent that he believed respondent was carrying narcotics,
and that he would be looking for narcotics in the car. We think that it
was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general
consent to search respondent's car included consent to search containers
within that car which might bear drugs. A reasonable person may be
expected to know that narcotics are generally carried in some form of
container. . . . The authorization to search in this case, therefore,
extended beyond the surfaces of the car's interior to the paper bag lying
on the car's floor.

9

The Supreme Court's reasoning in Jimeno should be applied in defendant's case.
* After the officer explained his concern that defendant had placed a weapon or
contraband under the passenger seat, defendant volunteered, "You're free to look if
you want." When asked if he would consent to a search, defendant said, "Go right
ahead." Defendant did not place any explicit limitation on the scope of the officer's
search under the seat. Since a reasonable person would be expected to know that a
weapon or contraband is usually carried in some kind of container, it was objectively
reasonable for the officer to conclude that defendant's consent to search under the seat
included his consent to search a container under the seat. Defendant's general consent
to search, therefore, extended to the leather case containing the incriminating drugs and
paraphernalia.
The Supreme Court distinguished Jimeno from a Florida case which found that
consent to search the trunk of a car did not include authorization to pry open a locked
briefcase found inside the trunk. fcL at 1804 (citing State v. Wells. 539 So.2d 464
(1989), aff d on other grounds, 110 S.Ct. 1632 (1990)). The Court concluded that "[i]t
is very likely unreasonable to think that a suspect, by consenting to the search of his
trunk, has agreed to the breaking open of a locked briefcase within the trunk, but it is
otherwise with respect to a closed paper bag." LL The same rationale applies in
defendant's case. There is no evidence the officer had to damage or destroy
defendant's leather case to open it.
10

The denial of defendant's suppression motion is also supported by Utah case
law. During a traffic stop in Castner- the officer observed a female passenger making
erratic movements before the driver brought the car to a stop. The officer asked the
driver if he had any drugs in the car. The driver said he did not, and consented to a
search. The officer located a zipped pouch at the female passenger's feet. As the
officer began to unzip the pouch, the passenger attempted to pull it away, but not
before the officer found that it contained marijuana and drug paraphernalia. The
female passenger got out of the car, holding her purse. The officer asked her if she had
any drugs in the purse. After she said she did not, the officer removed one of several
zipped pouches from the top of the purse and looked inside. He discovered two more
baggies of marijuana. The officer then removed a second pouch from the purse and
found that it contained a white powdery substance which turned out to be
methamphetamine. A search of the car trunk revealed a gym bag containing a set of
scales, and a suitcase containing a cardboard box which held more marijuana. Castner.
825P.2dat701.
Citing Jimeno. this Court upheld the search, concluding that "there is nothing in
the undisputed facts that even remotely suggests Castner limited the scope of consent
when [the officer] asked to search the vehicle. . . . We conclude the scope of consent
given extended to the contents of the containers found in the interior of the vehicle and
the trunk." I*Lat705.
11

This Court's holding in Castner fully supports the judge's ruling in defendant's
case. Since there was no limitation on defendant's consent to search under the
passenger seat, it extended to the contents of the leather case found under that seat.
In sum, because defendant's argument has been rejected by the United States
Supreme Court and this Court, the trial court's ruling denying his motion to suppress
should not be disturbed.
Point n
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY CURED
ANY ERROR IN THE PROSECUTOR'S COMMENT DURING
CLOSING ARGUMENT THAT "YOU ALL KNOW THE IMPACT
THAT THIS TYPE OF OFFENSE HAS"; IN ANY EVENT,
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH A REASONABLE
LIKELIHOOD THAT, EVEN ABSENT THIS COMMENT, HE
WOULD HAVE BEEN ACQUITTED.
Defendant argues that the prosecutor's comment, "you all know the impact that
this type of offense has," was so prejudicial that he should be granted a new trial (Def.
Br. at 8-11). However, after sustaining trial defense counsel's objection, the trial court
gave a curative instruction that was sufficient to make any error harmless.
The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether the prosecutor "calljed] to the
attention of the jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in determining its
verdict and, if so, under the circumstances of the particular case, whether the error is
substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its absence,
there would have been a more favorable result." State v. Tenney. 913 P.2d 750, 754
12

(Utah App. 1996) (quoting Wright. 893 P.2d at 1118 (quoting Peters. 796 P.2d at
712)). In determining whether a given statement constitutes prosecutorial misconduct,
"the statement must be viewed in light of the totality of the evidence presented at trial."
LL (citing Gardner. 789 P.2d at 287).
A prosecutor's comment to the jury that "it should be mindful of its obligation to
society in deciding whether to return a guilty verdict" constitutes error. State v. Dunn.
850 P.2d 1201, 1223-1224 (Utah 1993) (plain error where prosecutor argued that
"most important factor" for jury to consider was the impact of their verdict on society;
nevertheless, harmless error); accord State v. Andreason. 718 P.2d 400, 402 (Utah
1986) (per curiam) (error where prosecutor argued "people are watching" and that the
jury needed to be concerned about those "who aren't innocent but are turned loose";
prejudicial since marginal evidence of guilt); State v. Smith. 700 P.2d 1106, 1112
(Utah 1985) (error where prosecutor argued "our way of life" is on trial "and how the
public is going to perceive how the criminal law does its job"; nevertheless, harmless
error).
After the prosecutor's comment, when defense counsel objected, the trial court
immediately sustained the objection, admonished counsel, and instructed the jury:
[M]embers of the jury, let me just simply admonish you that your verdict
in this case, of course, must be based solely and totally upon the evidence
that is introduced during this particular case and, of course, you must not
be swayed by public opinion or public feeling. Your decision must be
based solely upon the evidence introduced during this case.
13

(R. 352). This instruction reiterated the trial court's previous instructions that the jury
was to decide the case solely on the basis of the evidence before it (see, e.g.. R. 103105, 113).
A jury is generally presumed to follow the trial court's instructions. Richardson
v. Marsh. 107 S.Ct. 1701, 1708 (1987); State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994)
(citing State v. Burk. 839 P.2d 880, 883-884 (Utah App.), cert.denied. 853 P.2d 897
(Utah 1993); State v. Hodges. 517 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1974). Given that presumption,
any error was harmless and there was no prejudice here. See Dunn. 850 P.2d at 12231224; Andreason. 718 P.2d at 402. The Utah Supreme Court has remarked:
We are able to assess only the words as they appear in the record. The
trial judge, on the other hand, was able to note other relevant factors such
as counsel's gestures, inflection, and expressions, as well as the jury's
reactions. . . . Trial courts are in a much better position than are
appellate courts to assess the overall effect of [alleged] attorney
misconduct at trial.
Donohue v. Intermountain Health Care. Inc., 748 P.2d 1067, 1068 (Utah 1987). The
trial court in this case determined that a curative instruction was sufficient. Apparently
defendant likewise deemed it sufficient since he did not move for a mistrial or a new
trial.
In any event, defendant has failed to establish a reasonable likelihood that, even
absent the prosecutor's comment, he would have been acquitted. Since the comment

14

"must be viewed in light of the totality of the evidence presented at trial," Tenney. 913
P.2d at 754, a review of the trial evidence follows.
At about 11:00 p.m. on February 20, 1994, defendant was driving southbound
on 300 West in Salt Lake City (R. 208-211). When he came to an intersection,
defendant failed to signal while making a left turn onto 4500 South (R. 211). A
uniformed officer driving a marked patrol car 40-50 feet behind defendant's car
activated his overhead red, white, and blue lights and blinking high-beam headlights,
and directed his spotlight into defendant's rearview mirror to initiate a traffic stop (R.
209, 211-213, 217, 245, 270-271, 272).
At that time of night, there were no other vehicles in the area, and the streets
were basically empty (R. 213, 272). The officer's spotlight illuminated the interior of
defendant's car (R. 214). Defendant failed to respond to the signal to stop, and the
officer observed defendant make several motions leaning over to the right side of the
car, out of sight. IEL; S££ alSQ R. 246-247, 272. Defendant drove several blocks
before finally stopping at 80 East on 4500 South (R. 214-215, 248). There were no
barricades, road construction, obstacles in the roadway, or other control devices that
would have prevented defendant from pulling over as soon as the officer activated his
lights (R. 216, 272).
After defendant finally stopped, when the officer approached the parked car, he
observed defendant lean to the right towards the floorboard and make another
15

"stuffing" movement under the right front seat (R. 217). At that point, the officer was
very concerned because defendant had taken such a long distance to stop, and, based on
his observations, the officer believed that defendant might be retrieving a weapon,
discarding a weapon, or discarding contraband. Id.
After making contact with defendant, the officer asked him why he was making
all of the motions to the right side of the car (R. 218, 249). Defendant said that he did
not know that he was (R. 218, 220). When the officer asked him if he had discarded
anything under the seat, defendant volunteered, "No, you're free to check if you want"
(R. 220).
At that point, the officer first noticed defendant's heavy perspiration on his
forehead and face, and his extreme nervousness (R. 218, 220, 242). It was a cold
winter night, and there was no apparent reason for defendant's perspiration (R. 212,
218-220, 240-241, 269-270, 275-276, 292-293, 308; but S££ R. 242-243). The officer
expressed to defendant that, because defendant appeared nervous, he was concerned
that defendant may have placed a weapon or contraband under the front seat (R. 220).
When the officer asked if he could look, defendant said, "Go right ahead" (R. 221,
275). Defendant got out of the car, and the officer conducted a patdown search finding
no weapons (R. 221-222, 251). Defendant had nothing in his hands that he might have
been reaching for during the stop (R. 262, 276-277).
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front seat where defendant said he could look (R. 222, h

**ee R 2~ '). The officer

limited his search to the area under that seat, and found a leather pouch partially
protruding, which he seized and opened (R. 222-223, 2891 The leather pouch was the
i l l , Mi in iiiinlrf (fin si Jill ill 1
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|n mli I linn plait" (he pouch under tin 1

passenger seat from the driver's seat, defendant would have had to lean over to his
right (R. 233). The pouch contained two baggies of marijuana, one glass vial
containing maryuana, a large papei bi iidle containing methamphetamine, a mirror with
w h i l e pu\Mli mi lies id in
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blades, and several unused paper bindles (R. 225-240, 255, 278; State's Exhibits 2-10).
These items served as the basis for defendant's convictions. When the officer asked
him about the pouch, defendant admitted that it v» as Ms, but denied knowledge or
< m fiership of ils n m l e i i l 1 Ill'11

?SQ-1W), KK 1< 263-265, ?78; bm see II1

III \

Ml

322,,

330). Defendant explained that he was in the area to try to sell some of his stainless
steel tools which turned out to be nothing more than a manicure set (R. 280, 282, 286).
Defendant testified .il trial "' I I • testified it was his 'recollection' ' that he "did"
signal before making * mm, that

J

Although he stipulated to the facts on his motion to suppress (R. 164-167; see
R. 39-40), and has not challenged the trial court's findings of fact on the motion as
clearly erroneous, defendant's trial testimony contradicted those same facts on several
key points

white car" to him, and that he first saw the officer "swinging and waving an arm" at
him, "had no idea that he was a police officer," and "thought he was some kind of
fanatical maniac." (R. 320, 334). Although at first apparently admitting that he did
see the lights on the police car (R. 320), defendant later testified that he didn't think the
officer "even had police emergency lights on his vehicle." (R. 323). In explaining
why he finally stopped, defendant testified:
Because I think one of the things he took from the window in his car was
to show me something that suggested he was a police officer. I am not
sure if it was his badge. I am not sure what it was, but it did take a little
bit of a spell for me to realize he was nobody that had any authority. He
looked more like somebody you wouldn't know what to do with for doing
what he was doing. He didn't look professional.
(R. 323). Defendant nevertheless testified that he could see a "badge" because, "[the
officer's] car came swinging up to the left of my car and that is the first time that I saw
[the officer] that night, and I at no time even know [sic] that it was anybody behind
me." I<L Defendant admitted that he does not wear glasses and had no problems with
his eyesight that night (R. 334).
When the officer initially asked about his movements to the right during the
stop, defendant testified that, "[a]t the time, I didn't know what [the officer] was
talking about." (R. 320-321). However, defendant explained, "I think now after
thinking about this quite a bit, I realize indeed I was bumping across the top of the seat
while I was putting on my seat belt." (R. 321). Defendant offered that he did not have
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seat belt on." I^L Defendant concluded, "I realize now that I could have been
searching for my seat belt." (R. 324).
Defendant testified that, when 'the officer asked linn to explain his movements
biiotr slopping, hr iliilll in I I 'Ill lln otlim (hull In w «i' i \\\u\)i to liislcn his seal hi ll
because, "[a]t the time, I didn't realize that I was doing it. This was a realization after
the fact " ^ ~~H Defendant later testified, "I only understood and came to this
conclusion after the fact that it could have been possibly that I was stretching for the

being pulled over. I was at that point starting to realize that this irate person over here
next to me could be a police officer." (R 333-334).
As to his use of the car, defendant initially testified that he was driving "our

and that there are "six kids'" in his family "and at that time there were two parents" (R.
317) Defendant was 45 years old at the time of his testimony (R. 315, 326), During
cross examination, defendant responded in I lie prosecutor's questions:
Q.
Hov* old are the other kids in the family?
A.
Is that relevant?
Q.
Yes, it is.
!l
"i
Okaj I have a twin brother the same age as myself. I have a
deceased little brother who is six years younger than I. I have an older
brother which is three years older than I. And I have a set of twins that
are, I think, approaching 30 now. They are Jeffrey and Parisy and they
19

are a tremendous family. I have a lot of respect for them and forgive me
I don't see them often enough as I would like to at all.
Q.
I guess the question I am driving at, Mr. Stephens, is how many
people are living at home with your parents?
A.
Actually, just my mother now.
Q.
Back on February 20th, who was living with your parents?
AI was as a caretaker? [sic]
Q.
No one else; is that correct?
A.
Just myself and all of the other family members come and go quite
a bit, but they weren't permanently sleeping there though.
Q.
You are not suggesting to this jury that because it is your mother's
car and registered in the Cromar name, which is your mother's name, that
she would have a purse that had narcotics in it, are you?
A.

Of course not.

(R. 328). Defendant also conceded on cross examination that he was driving the car
the whole evening. IsL
As for ownership of the leather pouch, defendant testified that he "definitely did
not" tell the officers that the leather pouch was his (R. 321), and suggested that they
may have misunderstood him because his voice was affected by cancer surgery,
(although, he testified, his voice was actually worse at trial) (R. 315, 321-322). Later,
defendant testified that it was "very disgusting to [him] to hear them claim that [he]
had" admitted owning the pouch (R. 330).
To explain the presence of the pouch in his car, defendant called a female friend
to testify that defendant drove a female she had only met once and never saw again
(identified only as "Debbie") to "some apartments on Redwood Road" that night (R.
299-302; g££ also R. 317). According to the witness, "Debbie" had shown up
20

unannouritnJ mid npsei m llir witness's linnsr rim I ,,islnll I'm ;i nnlr iR ¥»0| Sinn11 slur
did not really know "Debbie," 'the witness did not "even 'know why she came to my
house" (R. 300; £££ also R. 304). This was especially so, since the witness did not
drive, did not have a dri\ ei " s license, and did not even have a car. I$L; £££ also R.
VS

VhnrloTr iLruiii ^ testified \ha ,lv H<1 nl Jrfnidiiiii n \

happened

!ie

visiting, and who "didn't really want to" give this unknown person a ride, but that
e\ c aitually "he did." LL; sfiealSQR. 318. .
According to the defense witness, "Debbie* ' had "a bunch of bags with her""" (R.
S :: me of them
don't know, like a gym bag." IdL; see also R. 319. According to the witness,
"Debbie" sat in the back seat behind defendant, and put her bags on the passenger side,
benina the iront passenger seat where th, v>^ness was sitting (K >• •_. JOo. see also R.

pouch found in defendant's car (R. 301-302).
Although the witness testified she thought "Debbie" was probably 19 or 20 years
HI >ld < IK. 31)41, defendant thought she was possibly 2b to MI"1U Jl I i 118 > i) e f e n c |ant
testified that she WJ^

u

i lull mm i " | sn | ill1" I I i'i According It llir defense evidenee,

The assertion in defendant's brief that "Debbie" « s a t m gg ^ ^ s e a t ^^[^
the passenger seat while being transported" (Def. Br. at 10), is unsupported by the
record and is directly contradicted by the testimony defendant cites in support (R. 302).
Indeed, defendant himself testified that "Debbie" sat directly behind him (see. R, 319).
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the night of the traffic stop was the first and last time defendant ever saw "Debbie" (R.
300,318).
After agreeing that "Debbie" did not sit in the front seat, defendant testified,
that is another place where the officers changed their story because that
purse when I saw him pull it out, his arms was moving steady under that
seat to reach almost to the back seat and it was where it could have been
kicked quite easily from the position where that girl was. And so they
changed their testimony and lied to say where they had gotten it. And it
was despicable behavior for police officers to change their testimony to
attempt to indict somebody unfairly.
(R. 331; £££ also R. 332). Regarding the officers' purported lies, defendant concluded
that he "suspected it was possibly it could have been some kind of repercussion they
were directing at somebody, but I had no idea or not understanding why they were
trying to direct it on me." (R. 332).
Although it is clear the jury rejected defendant's testimony, defendant is
essentially asking this Court to reject the jury's conclusion about his credibility. The
Utah Supreme Court has written:
When the evidence presented is conflicting or disputed, the jury serves as
the exclusive judge of both the credibility of witnesses and the weight to
be given particular evidence. [Case citations omitted] Ordinarily, a
reviewing court may not reassess credibility or reweigh the evidence, but
must resolve conflicts in the evidence in favor of the jury verdict. [Case
citation omitted]
State v. Workman. 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993). Since the "unusual
circumstances," discussed in Workman, that might justify a reviewing court's
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determination should not be disturbed.
In short, given the 'weight of the prosecution's evidence balanced against
defendant's improbable and self-serving testimony, tins cast* did nol lui 111 on a single
ambition-, i" uiii ill Hionnmh. aiiiiiitniiill lh lln ruostYiilm iiiumln u'larK sine* (lie
comment was objected to and a curative instruction was given. Defendant has failed to
establish a reasonable likelihood that, but for this comment, he would have been
acquitted.
>NCLUSION
Defendant's convictions should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^6Kday

of May, 1997.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

/BARNARD N. MADSEN
Assistant Attorney General
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Addendum A

RLE- $S?BSK? CCttSfST
Third JifdiCia! District

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TEE THIRD JUDICIAL DIS^gjJG^ jggg
III

Mill

Hill

HUM

MIM 1 l i l l l l l M ,

III II II1 HI

UTAH,

THE S T A T E OF UTAH

Plaintiff

CASE WO.

951901961FS

vs.
FINDINGS OF TACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

BRYAN JAY STEPHENS
Defendant

JUDGE TYRONE E. MEDLEY
The above-ent. it led matter came before this court pursuant In
Defendant's MOTION TO SUPPRESS on the 2nd day of January 1996
challenging the search and subsequent seizure of controlled
substances and drug paraphernalia. The defendant although not
present was represented by his attorney of record, Robin K.
Youngberg, the State was represented by attorney of record,
Michael J. Christensen.
The Court having heard the arguments of both the defendant
and the State regarding the defendant's Motion to Suppress, now
advisei

following FINDINGS OF I'ACT ai

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

(in I i I i ii ii |

ii

Mi

ill I ih i'i mil \ Hi L.111I | M M 1 I I I in 1

Broadhead witnessed the defendant Bryan Jay Stephens violate the
traffic code l>y falling to properly signal while turning left
(£
11

inn wi
Deputy Broadhead activated his overhead lights to effect a
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traffic stop.

The defendant did not immediately stop and made

several rapid movements to the right prior to stopping.

As

Deputy Broadhead exited his vehicle and approached, the defendant
made another rapid *stuffing" movement *to the right*
3.

The defendant denied making any stuffing movements when asked

about his actions prior and after stopping by Deputy Broadhead.
In response to Deputy Broadhead's query if he had any concealed
weapons or contraband under the seat, the defendant said; "No,
you're free to look if you want.11
4.

Because of the defendant's apparent extreme nervousness,

Deputy Broadhead explained to the defendant his concern for his
safety as well as the possibility that the defendant had placed a
weapon or contraband under the front seat.

Deputy Broadhead

requested permission to check under the seat and the defendant
responded "Go right ahead.M
5.

The defendant exited the vehicle and Deputy Broadhead looked

under the right front seat where he observed the suspicious
movement.

Deputed Broadhead limited his search to the right

front area and found a brown leather case under the right front
seat.

On opening the leather case, Deputy Broadhead found

various controlled substances as well as drug paraphernalia.
6.

The defendant denied knowledge or ownership of the leather

case at which time Deputy Broadhead then Mirandized the defendant
and arrested him for possession of controlled substances and drug
paraphernalia.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

n

3

LII fill li'ic stop is governed by a two prong test: <1) Was Deputy
Broadhead # s action justified at its inception? -and (2) Was the
r e s u 111 i II I • Set en Il::;i c i i

e

circumstances justifying the interference in the first place?
Terrv v. Ohio.

„

1, 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d

Deputy Broadhead was constitutionally justified in stopping
the defendant ""s vehicle for a txaffic violation committed in his
prespi'ie • II-I 8 bate •» Lopez

8' 3 3

stipulated by both sides).
Deputy Broadhead's investigative questioning of the defendant
t
served to

dispel his concern about the defendant's

actions during * • course of the "traffic stop.

During

nt g, ill b
defendant.

brief

detai

State v. Grovier. 808 P.2d 133,136 (Utah

(quoting United States v. Sharpe. 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105,

Despite the purposes of a traffic stop, Deputy Broadhead's
inquiries though unrelated to the traffic violation were
O i l i CJI 1 " 1 Ml I |

I II 11 Ii I

suspicion.

Lopez at 113I

| | II III •'•

•
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Specifically
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the defendant

failed to immediately pull over when sir

1 1 i|| l the defendant

made s e v e i i t l
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topping,

and
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after stopping as the officer approached his vehicle, (3) the
defendant's denial of any ^stuffing" movements and apparent
extreme nervousness, and (4) Deputy Broadhead's concern for his
safety as veil as the possibility that the defendant was
concealing a veapon or contraband.
5.

The State has met its burden by shoving the defendant

voluntarily and specifically consented to Deputy Broadhead's
search of the front right area of his vehicle when (1) in
response to the inquiry about weapons and contraband he said
••You're free to look if you want." and (2) in response to a
request to search he said "Go right ahead.91

Grovier § 136. The

lav does not require a suspect to be informed of his or her right
to refuse or that the consent be written.

State v. Contrel. 886

P.2d 107, 111 (Utah Ct.App. 1994), State v. Delanev, 669 P.2d 4,
8 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
6.

The legality of the traffic stop coupled with the absence of

any illegal conduct by the deputy, and the defendant's voluntary
consent supports denial of the defendant's Motion to Suppress.
State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652, 655 (Utah App. 1992).
Moreover, in State v. Bradford. 839 P.2d 866, 869 (Utah Ct. App.
1992) the Utah Court of Appeals said: * If, while conducting a
legitimate Terry search of the interior of the automobile, the
officer should, as here, discover contraband other than weapons,
he clearly cannot be required to ignore the contraband, and the
Fourth Amendment does not require its suppression in such
circumstances.

w
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DECISION
Based on

above Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law,
11 Deputy m i I.MIKMII ' i, search of tne

defendant's vehicle was reasonable and limited, and conducted
with the defendant's specific voluntary consent. The defendant's

Dated this _/3

day of March, 1 9 9 ^ ^

fi

<^045

6
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the
following, this

/&

day of March, 1996.

Robin K. Youngberg, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
E. Neal Gunnarson, Esq.
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
Michael J. Christensen, Esq*
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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1

7-Eleven.

2

a way so you are able to snort various types of powder

3

controlled substances.

4

and see those.

5

Those are manufactured or they are made in such

You will be able to handle those

You will also be able to look at the mirror.

As

6

you look at the mirror and the glass, you will see the

7

lines that are across that.

8

testified, they are utilized for the razor blades cutting

9

those agents into a reasonable dose that is convenient for

And again as the officer

10

drawing them up your nose and snort them.

11

itself can be smoked out of the pipe.

12

particular items could be utilized in this pack for

13

purposes of drug ingestion, okay.

14

whole long lengthy list of what those items are used for.

15

But if they are utilized in any type if a way, it could be

16

an innocent thing such as a straw or a razor blade, or a

17

mirror or a pipe, when it is utilized in the ingestion of

18

drugs, then it becomes paraphernalia.

19

was charged also with that particular offense.

20

The marijuana

All of those

And you have got a

And that is why he

You may say, "Well, yeah we have got Mr. Stephens

21

charged with a crime.

There is no victim here with regard

22

to those offenses•

23

to present the case to you today, why all of the big fuss

24

and bother to occupy your time for a day?

25

know the impact that this type of offense has.

We have only taken roughly two hours

Well, you all

A A A 9 R4
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1

MR. YOUNGBERG:

2

THE COURT:

Objection, judge.

Sustained and Mr. Christensen I am

3

going to ask that you refrain from making that argument

4

and, members of the jury, let me just simply admonish you

5

that your verdict in this case, of course, must be based

6

solely and totally upon the evidence that is introduced

7

during this particular case and, of course, you must not

8

be swayed by public opinion or public feeling.

9

decision must be based solely upon the evidence introduced

10

during this case.

Your

You may proceed, Mr. Christensen.

11

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Thank you, Your Honor.

12

You have the right to consider with regard to

13

this defendant the issues of credibility, the issues of

14

whether or not those officers are telling the truth,

15

whether or not they have some motive to lie.

16

suggest to you, ladies and gentlemen, there has been

17

absolutely no motive to lie here today on the officers'

18

part.

19

asked Deputy Broadhead, "Why has it taken so long to get

20

this case tried?"

21

reason to get on the stand and perjure himself and had

22

that big of an interest in the case of convicting Mr.

23

Stephens, don't you think he would have been on that case

24

and had that thing filed the very next day with the other

25

officers and gone from there?

I would

In fact, on cross examination for Mr. Youngberg, he

Well, if Deputy Broadhead had some

nonas 2

